This paper provides evidence that a country's pension system is an important determinant for the development of its capital markets. Employing a unique event list of 87 pension funding reforms in 57 countries between 1976 and 2007, we find that pension funding reforms lead to larger stock and corporate bond markets relative to the time before the reforms and relative to other countries without such reforms. This effect is particularly driven by an increase in the primary market issuing activity and cannot be explained by a simultaneous political move to more market-oriented reforms in these countries in general. We find that the effect is particularly significant in emerging markets with a priori less developed capital markets.
Introduction
It has been widely documented that countries with better developed capital markets experience higher levels of economic growth.
1 This evidence has prompted an intense academic and policy-oriented debate on the determinants for well developed capital markets.
Two major lines of thought and resulting hypotheses have emerged in this debate. Capital markets might be less developed due to a lack of demand for capital or due to structural factors that constrain the supply of capital to develop its full potential. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the demand hypothesis is at odds with the empirical evidence, pointing for example to the relatively low development of capital markets in the United States in the early 20 th century, at a time when the demand for capital was high. The existing literature has thus mainly focused on the supply side and illustrated the importance of factors such as the legal system (La Porta et al., 1997 Porta et al., , 1998 , shareholder protection Volpin, 2005, 2006) , wealth distribution (Perotti and von Thadden, 2006) , and openness to trade and capital mobility (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) .
Pension systems have received far less attention in this debate. This is surprising for a number of reasons. First, private pension systems are the most important suppliers of capital for public entities and private corporations in most countries. The OECD reports that around 60% of total assets held by institutional investors worldwide mainly exist for the purpose of pension financing, and that the weighted-average ratio of total private pension assets to GDP amounts to 111% in 2007 in OECD countries. Second, private pension capital searches for long-term returns and can withstand short-term volatility. It can thus be viewed as an ideal source of economically efficient long-term financing, which in turn facilitates externally financed firm growth according to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) . Third, pre-funded pension systems can spread the gains of capital market investments to the broader population, improve capital markets' image, strengthen corporate governance, promote international asset diversification, and stimulate financial innovation. 2 Fourth and finally, most countries have to face the financial consequences of a rapidly aging population in the coming decades. This development threatens emerging countries in particular, since they are at risk to become old 1 See, for example, King and Levine (1993) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) , and Rajan and Zingales (1998) , or Bekaert et al. (2005) for the impact of stock market liberalization on economic growth. 2 Davis (1998 Davis ( , 2005 and Walker and Lefort (2002) provide an account of the direct and indirect benefits arising from the creation of pre-funded pension schemes.
before getting rich. Already today, policy makers are struggling to maintain retirement benefit levels without further stretching household deficits and sovereign debt levels. 3 It is not surprising therefore that pension systems and reforms are a pillar stone of political agendas around the globe. 4 This study examines whether pension systems have a systematic impact on capital market development across countries. Do countries with pre-funded pension systems have substantially larger capital markets relative to the size of their economy than do countries with pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, even after controlling for other variables that have been shown in the previous literature to impact capital market development? If this is indeed the case, the key challenge is to disentangle the causality of this relation. Do pre-funded pension systems lead to better developed capital markets as more capital can be allocated to companies? Or are financially developed countries more likely to adopt pre-funded pension systems as they can better rely on capital markets? This paper analyzes the causal link by focusing on pension funding reforms in countries around the world and analyzing how the development of capital markets in these countries reacts to these reforms. We make use of a unique hand-collected event list of 87 newly introduced pre-funded pension schemes in 57 countries, which allows conclusions about the direction of causality in the relationship between pension funding and development of capital markets.
We find that pension funding reforms indeed lead to larger stock and corporate bond markets, in particular in non-OECD countries with a priori less developed capital markets. The growth in these markets is particularly triggered by an increase in the issuance activity in primary markets following the pension reforms. While these reforms have a political motivation, their effect cannot be explained by a simultaneous political move towards more market orientation outside the pension system: Our results suggest that pension funding reforms do not coincide with general market oriented reforms in these countries. In addition, a cross-sectional analysis
shows that the quantity of pension assets in an economy is an important determinant for the absolute level of capital market development in that country. Economies with pre-funded pension systems have more developed capital markets as measured by the size of their stock and corporate bond markets. Moreover, pensions are shown to be as meaningful for the explanation of different levels of capital market development as is the legal system or other 3 In 2005, the OECD countries spent on average 7.0% of GDP or 16.9% of general government expenditures on public old age benefit expenditures. 4 See, for example, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) .
factors commonly cited in the literature like trade openness and capital mobility. Finally, pension funding can stimulate capital market development beyond the mere contribution of funds to the markets through a cultural or "ceiling-breaking" effect, whereby pension funds act as forerunners of other institutional investors such as mutual funds.
Our paper relates to different strands of the existing literature. The first strand comprises a number of studies that provide evidence that the qualitative and quantitative development of capital markets facilitates a country's economic growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993 , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998 , Rajan and Zingales, 1998 . Sizeable, developed capital markets are also believed to prevent economic crises or mitigate their effects, in particular in emerging markets.
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Second, our paper relates to the previously mentioned literature that identifies the supply side determinants of capital market development. In this context, there are also several studies that address the relationship between pension systems and capital markets. They provide first evidence that countries with high ratios of pension fund assets to GDP also tend to exhibit high ratios of stock market capitalization to GDP for example. 6 Röell (1996) finds the inverse static link, a negative relationship between the size of the stock market and the proportion of GDP devoted to unfunded public pensions. Other authors analyze the link between pension fund assets and stock market volatility, the link between pension fund assets and corporate and government bond yields, the impact of contractual savings on capital market development, the direct impact of pension assets on economic growth, or they develop preconditions for an impact of pension funding on capital market development. 7 In general, this research tends to be based on rather small sample sizes or anecdotal evidence. Empirical evidence about the direction of causality is particularly scarce. We systematically and quantitatively analyze with a large empirical sample the dynamic impact of pension reforms on capital markets and the role of pension systems for the cross-country and time-series variation in capital market development.
The third strand of literature relates to pension system origins and their macroeconomic implications. Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) analyze the motivation underlying the 5 The underdevelopment of bond markets in East Asia is often cited as influential for the Asian crisis in 1997 (e.g. Catalan et al., 2000 , Herring and Chatusripitak, 2001 , Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004 . 6 See, for example, Davis (2005) . 7 The following studies should be mentioned in this field: Catalan et al. (2000) , Davis and Hu (2004) , Hu (2006) , Samwick (2000) , Vittas (1998 Vittas ( , 2000 , and Walker and Lefort (2002) .
political pension system decision and provide evidence that national experience with (hyper-) inflation and wealth concentration explains the nature of a pension system in a given country.
The same motivation is addressed theoretically by Bhattacharya et al. (1998) , who mention risk aversion, liquidity needs, population growth, and capital returns as influential factors for the pension system decision. Finally, papers by Poterba et al. (1996) , Gale (1998), and Walker and Lefort (2002) show that the growth in pre-funded pension schemes boosts personal saving and is only partially offset by declines in discretionary saving. 8 As parametric adjustments are often deemed insufficient, structural reforms of the pension system have been popular among policymakers in the past decades, based on the belief that pension systems with more private assets are preferable over PAYG systems. 9 Increasing reliance on pre-funded pension schemes in both emerging and developed countries, however, is not yet evidence on their superiority vis-à-vis traditional PAYG systems. Our study also provides arguments for the ongoing discussion about the benefits of pre-funded systems relative to PAYG systems.
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A fourth strand of research deals with the implications of increased pension funding for corporate finance and corporate governance. Bodie (1990) suggests that pension funds have brought about qualitative developments in capital markets via the demand for financial innovations. Similarly, Davis (1998) predicts that pension funding will change the European financial landscape in the direction of the Anglo-Saxon marked-based corporate finance and governance practices and away from relationship-based lending. One specific example is the previously lower activity levels and reputation of private equity in Continental Europe vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxon countries, which has now improved following the inflow of pension savings. A more recent example for related pension literature at the micro level is the paper by Giannetti and Laeven (2009) , who assess the impact of pension funding reforms on ownership and corporate governance structures as well as valuation levels of individual companies.
In sum, our paper adds pension systems as an important factor to the literature on the determinants of capital market development. It provides evidence that countries with prefunded pension systems are characterized by higher levels of capital market development.
8 Catalan et al. (2000) and Davis (2005) also provide arguments why the supply of long-term funds for capital markets would increase through a switch to more pension pre-funding even if saving rates did not increase. 9 See, for example, Miles et al., 1999. 10 For this discussion on the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the two fundamental pension system types refer to Davis (1998) , Miles et al. (1999) , Vittas (2000) , or Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2006) among others.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of international pension systems. In Section 3 we explain our empirical research methodology.
Section 4 describes the data and shows summary statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results from both a panel event analysis and a cross-sectional analysis. In Section 6 we provide information on robustness checks. Section 7 comprises three country case studies; Section 8 concludes.
Overview of Pension Systems Internationally
Pension systems around the world have several components, which can generally be classified into three pillars. 11 The first pillar is public and includes the traditional, mostly mandatory, and unfunded PAYG pension schemes that rely on future taxation and often only provide a minimum safety net in the future. The second and third pillars are private. While the second pillar consists of occupational pension schemes, the third pillar comprises personal pension arrangements. Pension schemes in all three pillars can be mandatory or voluntary and have defined-benefit or defined-contribution characteristics. The key distinction for our purposes is the question of funding. The first public pillar is typically unfunded, although certain countries have supported their first pillars with public pension reserve funds, also called social security reserve funds, to prepare for demographic challenges. 12 In contrast, arrangements in the second and third pillar are mostly based on the principle of asset accumulation (or sometimes still book reserve financing).
13
National pension systems can thus be broadly classified into two groups: (i) systems that rely mostly on unfunded public pension spending (first pillar) and which are called PAYG systems, and (ii) systems that rely mostly on pre-funded pension schemes (usually second and third pillar) and which are called pre-funded pension systems. Figure 1 shows the replacement rates from the public system and the country's level of accumulated private pension assets for 11 We use the same classification terminology as the OECD, e.g. Demographical changes and the resulting declining ratio of workforce to retired population pose a challenge for the sustainability of pension systems, in particular for countries with PAYG systems. Countries react to this challenge in different ways. First, they perform parametric adjustments of the pension system through an increase of the effective retirement age, an increase of the contribution levels, or a reduction of the replacement ratios. Second, policymakers often launch more substantial, structural pension funding reforms so that additional pre-funded pension components are integrated into the pension system. In some countries pension systems are even completely remodelled from a PAYG system to a prefunded system. It has been argued that privatized, pre-funded pension systems will be more adapt to cope with the demographic challenges than pure PAYG systems (Miles et al., 1999) .
They are also said to avoid the adverse impact PAYG systems have on economic growth. 15 In order to relieve public budgets, which are increasingly affected by the growing burden of public pension obligations, private and corporate pension saving is hence encouraged/mandated and/or fiscally incentivized by many governments through these pension funding reforms.
Adding additional pre-funded components to the pension system or even gradually shifting towards a fully pre-funded system has thus been a popular political decision around the world.
The trend was inspired by the pension reform pioneered in Chile in 1981 and the World Bank 14 Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) also use the ratio of private pension assets to GDP because "this measure offers a continuum between fully pre-funded and unfunded programs, to capture the fact that in practice all pension programs observed have aspects of pre-funded and unfunded systems". The Non-OECD member countries, present in our data sample, could be also classified according to the overall nature of their pension system. However, there is no consistent data available for gross public replacement rates and instead of total private pension assets the classification could only be based on pension fund assets. 15 Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) mention the discouragement of private saving, the encouragement of early retirement, high payroll taxes, and the stimulation of underground economic activities as adverse effects of PAYG systems. They also provide further advantages of pre-funded pension schemes.
reform blueprint Averting the Old Age Crisis that recommended the establishment of multipillar pension systems. This has happened despite the difficulties that arise in the reform transition period from the double strain on the working population to both support the retired population through the traditional scheme and provide a funded basis for their own retirement income (e.g. Holzmann, 1997) . The trend holds true both for countries with already prefunded national pension systems and in particular for countries with previously predominantly PAYG systems. There are several success factors for pension funding reforms. Vittas (2000) mentions "feasibility preconditions" like macroeconomic stability, sound financial institutions, and effective regulation, as well as "impact preconditions" like critical mass, conducive regulations, and pluralistic structures on the investor side. In the long run, interdependencies with capital markets need to be considered. First, the returns achieved on pension money investments are crucial for the adequateness of retirement income levels. Second, the degree of possible diversification across countries and asset classes determines the return and risk profile. Third and related to the first factors, the in-and outflow of pension assets into capital markets needs to be incorporated into policy drafting in particular in times of demographic changes. Especially in emerging markets with new pre-funded systems and pension funds that dominate domestic stock and bond markets, pre-funding can fuel rapid capital market growth in the asset accumulation phase, as our results will show, but also pose risks later on.
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16 Examples include Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Russia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. 17 Even in the US with its mature capital markets there have been warnings about a potential asset meltdown when the "baby boom" generation will retire (e.g. Goyal, 2004 , or Poterba, 2001 for a more cautious view).
Empirical Methodology
The static link between pension systems and capital market development is illustrated in Figure 2 . It suggests that capital markets are better developed in countries with pre-funded systems than in countries with PAYG systems. 18 However, the causal relationship between pension funding and capital market development is not clear. Do pre-funded pension systems lead to better developed capital markets as they can allocate more capital to these markets? Or do financially developed countries choose to adopt pre-funded pension systems as investors can better rely on the functioning of capital markets in these countries? Our empirical strategy to disentangle these two effects is to focus on pension funding reforms in countries around the world and to analyze how capital market development in these countries reacts to them.
Pension funding reforms are particularly useful events to examine the issue of causality for at least three reasons. First, these reforms are determined mainly by political considerations and in particular the trade-off between the objective of sustainable retirement systems, for which pre-funded systems are considered more apt, and potential reservations towards pre-funded systems as a result of wealth distribution shocks (Perotti and Schwienbacher, 2009) . 19 Second, pension funding directly contributes to the growth of stock and bond markets if the resulting additional saving is not offset by declines in discretionary saving. The evidence by Poterba et al. (1996) , Gale (1998) , and Walker and Lefort (2002) among others, suggests that the net effect is positive. Third, pension assets flow to a significant extent into domestic stock and bond markets. This is the case for at least two reasons: legal restrictions and home bias. Legal restrictions are particularly severe in emerging economies, as shown by Davis (2005) . At the same time, the allocation of pension assets to domestic markets is often even higher than the legal threshold. On average 58.9% of pension funds' stock investments in our sample are allocated to domestic capital markets. 20 This confirms the evidence on home bias in pension funds by Davis (1998) and for investors in general by Huberman (1999) amongst others. 18 The most remarkable outliers are Hong Kong and Luxemburg. Both are important financial centers with exceptionally developed stock markets despite little private pension assets due to small populations with moderate pension liabilities and high involvement of foreign investors. We therefore exclude Hong Kong and Luxembourg from our panel data sample.
19 Vittas (1998) argues that "the promotion of private pension funds and insurance companies should be pursued for their own sake and their potential economic, fiscal and financial benefits and should not depend on the prior development of securities markets". 20 Individual differences are large, however, with the Netherlands (12.9%) and Norway (19.2%) at the lower end and Korea (100.0%) and Poland at the upper end (98.2%). The corresponding ratio for the public pension reserve funds from the first pillar is 61.5%. Corporate bond markets tend to sell largely to domestic investors while government bonds are generally more internationalized (Davis, 1998 Our dependent variable is the growth of capital markets, and here we are particularly interested in the size of arm's length capital markets as pension assets are mainly invested in these markets. We thus follow Catalan et al. (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) and define the dependent variable as the growth of total market capitalization divided by GDP. We concentrate on stock and corporate bond markets, while we exclude government bond markets as their size is primarily driven by government fiscal policy (Davis, 2005) . We also exclude other measures such as the level of credit in an economy or the size of the banking sector, as pension assets are generally not invested in private debt.
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We perform an event analysis with a modified differences-in-differences methodology as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) to assess the impact of pension funding reforms on capital market growth. 22 Our main explanatory variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the year in which a pension reform takes place in a given country as well as in several consecutive years (event window) and a value of 0 otherwise. We work with 3, 5, and 10 years as event windows to measure the dynamic impact of the event, as it may take several years until substantial funds are collected in a new pension plan and invested in capital markets. The dummy variable also takes a value of 0 for those countries without any pension reforms, which serve as control countries only.
countries showing the highest ratios (Canada 50.0%, Hong Kong 52.6% and United States 59.2%) and some countries with less than 10% (Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Israel, Korea, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). The public pension reserve funds from the first pillar have a moderately higher stock allocation of 31.6% (4.1% of GDP) on average in their portfolios. 21 Stock market capitalization / GDP is the primary indicator for capital market development used in a number of studies. For a discussion of different indicators refer to the publications of La Porta et al. (1997) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Beck et al. (1999) , and Zingales (1998, 2003) . 22 Although in principle similar to the difference-in-difference framework (as e.g. in Gruber and Poterba, 1994) our setting is not suitable for the standard framework due to the different timing of the events and the fact that some countries have more than one event in the sample period. We therefore use a modified framework as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) .
The impact of the events is expected to depend on the level of capital market development and the pillar in which the reforms take place. First, the level of capital market development before the funding reform may matter for the impact of the reform. We expect the reforms to have a larger impact in emerging markets with less developed capital markets and therefore evaluate sub-samples of developed and emerging countries. Second, the impact of reforms may also depend on the pillar in which they take place. The size of the pillar and the level of concentration on the asset management side -total funds in the second and third pillar are usually higher than in the first pillar and there is a far greater number of asset managers in the second and third pillar -could impact capital markets differently, and thus we also differentiate between pillars.
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We control for the level of economic development, as advanced economies ceteris paribus have a larger demand for capital and hence more sophisticated capital markets than less developed countries. We follow Rajan and Zingales (2003) and use the logarithm of GDP per capita, which they refer to as demand for finance.
Consequently there are two sources of identifying variation in our panel event analysis: (i) the time before and after the events (the periods are different for each country) and (ii) the crosssection of countries with an event in a certain event window versus the countries without an event in this time period. Hence, our first regression equation, which is very similar to that in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , looks as follows:
where Y i,t is the yearly relative growth rate in stock or corporate bond market capitalization / GDP for a given country i in year t. 24 The EVENT DUMMY i, t takes a value of 1 if year t falls into an event window in which country i passes a pension funding reform and a value of 0 otherwise. We expect a positively significant coefficient β 1 reflecting a superior growth rate in market capitalization / GDP for event countries in an event window year, which stems from the additional pension funds flowing into the respective capital market. Our control variable 23 The first pillar generally consists of a single public fund whereas the second and third pillar can be very fragmented like in Australia, which had more than 360,000 pension funds in 2007 (often with less than 5 members). In other countries occupational and personal schemes are serviced by fewer funds, for example 178 in Germany and only 20 in Poland, but still more than in the first pillar. Distinguishing between the second and third pillar is relatively difficult because many reforms affect both occupational and personal pension schemes. We therefore only analyze the first pillar separately from the second and third. 24 The relative growth rate is calculated as the natural logarithm in year t minus the natural logarithm in year t-1.
X i, t measures GDP per capita in country i at year t. A i and B t are fixed effects for country and year, respectively, which control for unobserved country and year heterogeneity. The methodology thus also fully accounts for the fixed differences between the event countries and the control countries, in which no pension reforms take place, via the country fixed effects. ε i,t is an error term.
We want to use our evidence from the first regression to further look into the contemporaneous relationship between pension systems and the level of capital market development with a larger cross-sectional sample and recent data from 2007. Pension funds are the most important institutional investors in many countries and in particular in the AngloSaxon world. They provide stable demand for securities coupled with a long-term investment horizon. It is therefore likely that in countries where these investors play no or only a minor role, stock and corporate bond markets are ceteris paribus smaller.
Our second main regression for the cross-sectional data sample expands the equation used by
Rajan and Zingales (2003):
where Z i is the ratio of stock or corporate bond market capitalization / GDP for country i. γ 0 is a constant. T i stands for trade openness, which Rajan and Zingales (2003) identify as a driver of capital market development, and which is measured by the sum of imports and exports / GDP for country i. P i represents the level of pension assets in an economy and is expressed by pension fund assets / GDP in country i. Private pension assets are primarily invested through pension funds. OECD countries have on average 67% of their total private pension assets invested in pension funds and the remainder through pension insurance contracts, personal plans managed by banks and investment companies, book reserve systems, which are still popular in some countries like Germany or Canada, and a residual category comprising all other types. 25 We primarily use data at the pension fund level as it is available in greater detail and as pension fund assets are widely used as an indicator for the importance of pension assets relative to the size of the economy (Davis and Hu, 2004 , Hu, 2006 , Perotti and Schwienbacher, 2009 , Walker and Lefort, 2002 . 26 When possible we also run our analyses with total private pension data, and the results are very similar.
X i controls again for GDP per capita in country i. We expect a positively significant coefficient for both γ 1 and γ 2 implying that the choice of the pension system has explanatory power for the absolute level of market capitalization / GDP beyond the measure used by Rajan and Zingales (2003) . ε i,t is an error term.
Data Description and Summary Statistics
We evaluate the impact of pension funding reforms on capital market development by using the universe of countries covered by the OECD's pension research team in different publications and databases. These countries encompass all 30 OECD member states plus 42 non-member states, i.e. all larger developed economies and emerging markets. For these 72 countries we assemble a unique event list that consists of all pension system changes in which a pre-funded component is added to the national pension system. An event is thus a unique year-country combination defined as the year in which a country passes legislation on a new pre-funded pension system component (or decides to switch to a fully pre-funded system).
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The Rajan and Zingales (2003) . Data on pension fund assets divided by GDP and pension fund stock investments / GDP stems from the OECD. 
Empirical Results

Event Study
Univariate Results
We first report univariate results using the panel data sample. In particular, we test whether countries realize higher growth rates of corporate bond and stock market capitalization over GDP following the introduction of new pre-funded pension schemes, relative to the other years and relative to the other countries without events. We calculate non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test statistics to compare the median growth rates.
The results in Panel A of Table 3 show that the average relative growth rates in corporate bond market development are consistently higher in event than in non-event years for each event window and for each of the three country groups. The median rate for the event years of the total sample over the 3-year event window is 6.3%, whereas the rate is only 3.7% for the non-event years. The difference is economically and statistically highly significant with a pvalue of 0.008. The test statistics for the total sample are significant at the 1%-level for the two other event windows as well. The corresponding rates for the non-OECD countries are again highly significant for each event window. For the OECD countries, the differences are significant for the 5-year and 10-year event windows, but not for the 3-year event window.
These results suggest that the additional funds flowing into the market have a faster impact on non-OECD than on OECD countries, but that these effects are long-lasting in OECD countries. Here the effect is still significant at the 1%-level for the 10-year event window.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the analogous results for the stock markets. The median average relative growth rates in stock market development are also higher in event than in non-event years for each event window and for each of the three country groups. For the total sample the 32 The range extends from Romania, Albania and Pakistan with less than 1% to Iceland, Netherlands, and Switzerland with significantly above 100%. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States follow the trio at the top end directly with ratios of 105.3%, 86.1%, and 74.3% respectively.
rates are 11.0% versus 7.5% over the 3-year event window, but the difference fails to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.203. The same holds for the other two event windows. The mean relative growth rates, which are less meaningful due to some extreme growth rates in the sample, are similar for both event and non-event years for the total sample. 33 For the sub-sample of non-OECD countries, the median growth rates amount to 15.9% in event years and 7.5% in non-event years, and the difference is significant at the 1%-level. For these countries, the difference between event and non-event growth rates is significant also for the 5-year horizon with a p-value of 0.062, which loses its significance for the 10-year horizon. For non-OECD countries, also the mean growth rates in event years exceed the rates in non-event years: 17.3% versus 12.4% over the 3-year window. For the sub-sample of OECD countries no statistically significant effect can be found. The results are in line with our hypothesis that pension funding reforms result in superior market growth;
these results are more significant for non-OECD countries, where both corporate bond and stock markets are affected.
These univariate results provide a first indication for the impact of pension reform on capital market development. In the subsequent chapter, we control for other factors in multivariate regressions.
Multivariate Results
We now report multivariate results using the panel data sample. As in the univariate analysis we test again whether countries realize higher growth rates of corporate bond and stock market capitalization over GDP following the introduction of new pre-funded pension schemes. In the multivariate regressions, we use the empirical specification as outlined in Equation (1). We control for GDP per capita and include year and country fixed effects. We also distinguish between two sub-classifications, which are the a priori level of capital market development as indicated by OECD membership status, and the pension reform pillar.
As the differences in the variances of the regression residuals between the different countries are highly significant, we employ a weighted GLS model for between-group (-country) heteroskedasticity. The inverse of the residual variance is used as weighting 33 Examples for extreme log growth rates of stock market capitalization over GDP are Bulgaria which lost 208% in 1997 (87% in nominal growth terms), Macedonia which lost 185% in 1998 (84% in nominal growth terms), and Uruguay which lost 128% in 2006 (72% in nominal growth terms). On the positive side, Russia's ratio picked up by 455% in 1996 (9,364% in nominal growth terms), Bulgaria's ratio by 448% in 1998 (8,765% in nominal growth terms), and Poland's ratio by 205% in 1993 (680% in nominal growth terms).
factor. 34 We use Newey-West standard errors with an unrestricted covariance structure to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, which is recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004) as a preferred instrument for dealing with autocorrelation in panel data under crosssectional heteroskedasticity.
35 Table 4 The results suggest furthermore that the effect on the bond markets takes longer to be detectable for the OECD countries than for the non-OECD countries, where coefficients are again declining in level and significance. In the case of the OECD countries, however, the largest impact is found in the 5-year event window with a coefficient of 0.028 at the 10%-significance level, and the most significant positive coefficient is recorded for the 10-year period. An explanation could be that the reforms in developed countries are often voluntary and less fundamental in nature so that it takes longer until the newly collected pension funds matter for corporate bond market growth.
We distinguish between the pillars for further insights. In Panel A of Table 4 the results appear to be driven by reforms in the second and third pillar, where the coefficients are more 34 See, for example, McCrary (2002) for the problem of between-group heteroskedasticity. 35 We use a maximum lag of five years. 36 This result is consistent with Davis (2005) who also finds a much stronger correlation between pension fund assets and corporate bond market capitalization for emerging markets in his simple correlation analysis.
significant and higher than for the first pillar, e.g. 0.030 versus 0.008 in Column (ii). But unlike in the case of the full sample, the sizeable public pension reserve funds in the OECD (Panel B) have also contributed to corporate bond market development as the coefficients are higher than for the second/third pillar dummy, e.g. 0.024 versus 0.015 in Column (vi). We omit the first pillar dummy for the non-OECD countries (Panel C) since there are only two first pillar reforms for which there is corporate bond market capitalization data; Columns (ii), (iv), and (vi) therefore capture funding reforms in the second and third pillar only.
Our dependent variable, the growth in the ratio of corporate bond market development / GDP, reacts positively to higher levels of GDP per capita. This implies that more developed economies have faster growing bond markets than emerging markets: the coefficients are all highly significant, in Panels A and B even at the 1%-level in each Column. Although at first glance perhaps counterintuitive, this result is consistent with previous studies according to which corporate bond markets in most emerging markets are fundamentally underdeveloped and do not follow the growth pattern of stock markets (Hakansson, 1999 , Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004 , Herring and Chatusripitak, 2001 ).
Companies in Asia and Latin America for example were still relying much more on bank financing than on bond financing even when stock and government bond markets were already well developed; and still today corporate bond markets in these regions are much underdeveloped or even still largely inexistent (Pomerleano, 1999 , Luengnaruemitchai and Ong, 2005 , De, 2006 , Eichengreen et al., 2006 . 37 And relative to the US markets in almost all countries and in particular Japan and the countries of Continental Europe were not long ago also still considered significantly underdeveloped which, however, in the case of these developed economies has changed in recent years, also due to the emergence of pension funds (and the introduction of the Euro among other reasons) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995 , Pagano and von Thadden, 2004 , Luengnaruemitchai and Ong, 2005 .
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37 Also in Central and Eastern Europe corporate bond markets are still today almost inexistent. Herring and Chatusripitak (2001) provide arguments why bond markets fail to develop in environments with weak financial infrastructure although equity markets flourish. Further reasons for sluggish corporate bond market development in emerging markets are low degrees of disintermediation and a lack of well-functioning derivative markets, the failure to follow internationally recognized accounting standards, the insufficient country size, the lack of sophistication in credit risk assessment, the importance of a benchmark yield curve, typically constructed from a suite of outstanding government and money market securities, which is often not available in emerging markets, and crowding out of corporate bonds by government bonds (Chan-Lau, 2005 , De, 2006 , Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004 , Hakansson, 1999 , Luengnaruemitchai and Ong, 2005 . 38 "Issuance of corporate bonds has taken off on an unprecedented scale in Continental Europe" (Pagano and von Thadden, 2004) . Our observation that in recent years, industrialized countries, such as Iceland, Ireland, and Greece have seen some of the highest growth rates in the sample, is therefore consistent with prior research.
Analogous to Table 4 we report the results of our multivariate regressions for the ratio of stock market capitalization / GDP in Table 5 These results are consistent with several findings from the previous literature: (i) Davis and Hu (2004) show that pension assets contribute more to economic growth in emerging markets than in OECD countries, (ii) Bailliu and Reisen (1998) find that the impact of pension funding on personal saving rates is eight times higher for emerging markets with more imperfect capital markets than for developed countries, and (iii) Catalan et al. (2000) report a weaker causal influence of contractual savings on capital market development in developed countries.
Another observation can be made about the pillars responsible for the significant coefficients Stock allocations and domestic investment shares are similar for the public funds and the private pension funds and cannot explain the different results between the pillars. At the same time, public pension reserve funds in non-OECD countries are rather small. Excluding Jordan whose exceptionally large public fund has a dominating role in Jordan's economy, the public funds' assets in the non-OECD countries only account for 3% of GDP whereas the corresponding ratio for the OECD member states is 10%. In relative terms, Japan, Jordan, and
Sweden have the largest public funds measuring around a third of GDP (average of 9.2%).
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A further argument is provided by Vittas (2000) who mentions the importance of pluralistic structures on the pension fund asset management market. Whereas second and third pillar schemes give rise to at least several if not plentiful of different pension funds, a scheme in the first pillar is usually administered by a single entity. Finally, the results of Giannetti and Laeven (2009) stress the importance of pension funds being large and independent. First pillar funds, however, are under higher political influence, in particular in developing countries.
As opposed to corporate bond market development, the impact of GDP per capita is now negative and significant, mostly at the 5%-level, in all three Panels. The negative coefficient, e.g. -0.329 in Panel C, Column (i), implies that countries with higher GDP per capita see lower growth rates of stock market development compared with developing countries whose stock market development is growing faster, albeit from a lower level. Hence, we conclude from Table 5 that new pre-funded personal or occupational pension schemes lead to larger stock markets in non-OECD countries even after controlling for GDP per capita. There is no such effect for developed economies and, as a consequence, no statistically significant effect for the sample of all countries.
In sum, we find that pension funding reforms contribute to larger corporate bond markets across the globe and that public pension reserve funds seem to account for part of the strong growth in corporate bond market size in OECD countries and particularly in Europe where these markets were underdeveloped not long ago. In non-OECD countries, pension funding reforms, in particular in the second and third pillar, have also contributed to larger stock markets. It is important to analyze whether the additional growth in stock market size from pension funding reforms in non-OECD countries is driven by price or volume effects. Do the pension funding reforms solely lead to rising stock prices (and potentially to market bubbles in these mostly nascent stock markets) or are the reforms followed by higher equity issuance activity, thus affecting the primary capital market? To address this question, we decompose the total growth in the ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP from Panel C in Table 5 into two parts: first, growth that is driven by equity issuance activity; second, growth that is the net result of price effects as well as non-equity-issuance-related volume effects such as delistings. Table 6 shows the results. The event dummy coefficients in Columns (i), (iii), and (v), where the dependent variable is the issuance-related component of the growth rate, are all positive and significant. In Columns (ii), (iv), and (vi), however, where the dependent variable is the remaining component of the growth rate, only one dummy coefficient is significant at the 10%-level (Column (iv)). These results suggest that pension funding reforms in emerging markets trigger increasing equity issuance activity, thus providing important capital supply for primary equity markets. 
Cross-Sectional Study
Using the evidence that pension system decisions influence capital market development and not vice versa, we will now take a closer look at the link between the level of pension fund assets and the level of capital market development in an economy using the empirical specification outlined in Equation (2). In Table 7 we test this by regressing the absolute level of stock and bond market capitalization / GDP on different pension system indicators, the trade openness indicator from Rajan and Zingales (2003) as well as the control variable GDP per capita, for a larger number of countries than in the panel data set. We use a smoothed average over 2005-2007 to deal with cyclicality as in Rajan and Zingales (2003) .
Apart from the two pension indicators total private pension assets / GDP and pension fund assets / GDP, which we have already outlined in Section 3, we use two further pension funding indicators for robustness reasons. We first construct a pension system dummy variable with the pension fund asset / GDP data series where countries with ratios of above 40 We also attempt to further decompose the equity-issuance-related volume effect into the part stemming from IPOs and the part stemming from SEOs, in order to address the question, whether pension funding reforms affect firms considering a stock market listing and already listed firms differently. However, consistent international panel data on IPO and SEO activity over a longer time period are not available. Nevertheless, primary analysis with data from the World Federation of Stock Exchanges between 1995 and 2007 implies that pension funding reforms affect IPO more than SEO activity.
30% have a dummy set to equal 1 and otherwise 0. 41 A more exact regressor for stock market development is the part of pension fund assets invested in stocks. However, the OECD provides this variable for fewer countries than for total pension fund assets and we have no corresponding figures for the bond allocation. Table 7 shows that the impact on the results for stock market development between the two regressors is very similar: the coefficient in Column (iv) representing all pension fund assets is significant at the 1%-level and so is the coefficient in Column (vi) representing stock investments only.
In Columns (i) and (ii) of Panel A we replicate the results of Rajan and Zingales (2003) with data from today and achieve very similar results compared to theirs. In Column (i) stock market development is regressed on trade volume directly and in Column (ii) trade volume is interacted with GDP per capita. 42 In Columns (iii) and (iv) we add pension fund assets as our main pension system indicator variable, also once directly and once interacted as in Rajan and Zingales (2003) . The adjusted R² increases significantly from 32% to 50% and from 34% to 51%, and both explanatory variables are significant at the 1%-level. The results remain unchanged for alternative specifications using the pension dummy variable in Column (v) and pension assets invested in stocks / GDP in Column (vi). In the latter case, adjusted R² sees another slight increase to 54% likely to stem from the higher explanatory power of this variable for stock market development. Data on total private pension assets including assets from first pillar public pension reserve funds is only available for the 30 OECD countries. If we use this variable interacted with GDP per capita as the explanatory variable together with trade openness, the pension system is again highly significant at the 1%-level with a coefficient of 0.12 and an adjusted R² of 49% (results unreported). The results suggest that pension funding is similarly important for stock market development as is trade openness.
Panel B depicts the analogous specifications for corporate bond development / GDP as a dependent variable. While trade volume is not able to explain the cross-sectional variation of the dependent variable this time, the pension system indicators are statistically significant and result in adjusted R² coefficients doubling from 13% to 26% in both direct and interacted 41 The cut-off ratio of 30% is arbitrarily chosen but reflects a natural gap between countries with ratios of around 20% or less (PAYG systems) and other countries with ratios of more than 30% (pre-funded systems). Changing the cut-off ratio to 50% does not affect the results. 42 Like Rajan and Zingales (2003) we report both the direct and the interacted effect in separate regressions in this and the next table. Rajan and Zingales' (2003) claim is that openness matters and that the separation of the direct and the interacted effect is not possible, because openness and the interaction are highly correlated and because of the paucity of observations. While the correct specification could be debated, they argue that the interaction is likely to be the more important factor.
specification. Since we have no data for the part of pension assets invested in corporate bonds, Column (vi) remains empty. The results from Panel A and Panel B confirm that we find an important additional determinant for capital market development. The cross-sectional variation in stock market development is well explained by trade openness and pension system with adjusted determination coefficients of above 50%, and the variation in corporate bond market development is likewise reasonably well determined by pension funding alone with adjusted coefficients of around 30%.
In order to gain more insight into the role of pension systems on capital markets we eliminate the direct contribution of the pension system to stock market development in Table 8 . By subtracting the parts of pension fund assets invested in stocks from the market capitalization we test whether the influence of the pension system goes beyond the mere contribution of funds to capital markets. In Columns (i) and (ii) trade volume as a second regressor is omitted and pension fund assets remain significant at the 10%-level. In combination with trade volume (Columns (iii) and (iv)) the significance rises to the 5%-level and adjusted R² almost triples from 15% to more than 40%. These results hint at the importance of the pension system for capital market development. It is likely that the pre-funded pension system has a multiplying or cultural effect which increases the sophistication and role of capital markets in a country through induced lower volatility and cost of capital requirements, demand for financial innovations, and other qualitative improvements, which subsequently leads to quantity and price effects in the form of more stock offering by companies and higher demand for stock investments from institutional investors other than pension funds. 43 This finding supports also the anecdotal evidence by Vittas (1998) whereby pension funds predate the development of securities markets and mutual funds follow it. The pension system might thus help to overcome the structural impediments that prevent the supply of capital from rising to meet demand (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . In addition, in terms of political sequencing and analogous to Pagano and Volpin (2006) for shareholder protection regulation, pension reforms can create the pre-conditions and support for future market-oriented reforms.
In Table 9 we finally assess the role of the pension system -as both the result of political decision-making and a determinant for capital market development -relative to other factors commonly found important in the literature (La Porta et al., 1997 , Pagano and Volpin, 2005 , Perotti and von Thadden, 2006 ) and relative to trade openness, which is partially 43 Refer to Catalan et al. (2000) , Davis (1998 Davis ( , 2005 and Walker and Lefort (2002) for explanations how pension funding is conducive also to qualitative improvements, which lead to more developed capital markets.
politically influenced as well (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . In Columns (i) to (v) pension fund assets / GDP as our main pension system indicator variable, trade openness, and one of the following other political variables (civil law indicator, rule of law index, accounting quality index, creditor rights and shareholder rights index) is used as explanatory variable for stock market development. The pension system indicator is significant at the 1%-level for each specification, trade openness at the 10%-level or higher. From the other political variables only accounting quality results in a statistically significant coefficient. In Column (vi) we use all political variables as independent variables and the pension system indicator, trade openness, and again accounting quality, turn out to be the only significant variables. The inclusion of the other political factors does reduce the adjusted R² compared with Column (iii). We conclude that the pension system is an important political instrument for the development of capital markets.
Robustness
We perform several tests to check the robustness of the results in our study.
Influence of Reforms in Formerly Communist Countries
One possible question is to what extent the reforms in formerly communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990ies contribute to the results in this paper, in particular the finding that pension funding reforms lead to faster growing corporate bond and stock markets. Could the results in this paper solely be driven by these countries? There are two observations that make this scenario implausible. First, formerly communist countries do not account for a large fraction of the full sample: 15 out of the 57 reform countries representing 27 out of the 87 sample reforms are formerly communist countries. Second, we employ the framework in Table 4 and use event dummy variables interacted with capitalist and excommunist dummy variables in Columns (ii), (iv), and (vi). Unreported results show that both coefficient types are positive and significant. Similarly, the same procedure for stock market development shows that our significant results for non-OECD countries are in fact only driven by capitalist countries.
Privatizations
Another question is whether pension funding reforms might be confounded by privatization events such that our results may capture their impact rather than the impact of pension reforms on capital markets. The first point here is that privatizations only affect stock markets and not corporate bond markets. 44 
General Capital Market-Oriented Reforms
Finally, one could argue that pension funding reforms may coincide with general marketoriented reforms so that our results could capture only one component of a broader political effort to improve stock and corporate bond markets. We address this point by analyzing the government's participation in the economy as a proxy for general market orientation. We use data from Penn World Table and test whether the absolute ratio of government share of GDP is lower in event years than in non-event years and whether there are differences in the absolute and relative year-on-year changes. In non-OECD countries there are no significant differences in the yearly changes between event and non-event years. For example, in the 5-year event window, the average yearly change is -0.3 percentage points in event years and -0.2 percentage points in non-event years. The difference is insignificant with a p-value of 0.375. For the ratio, we even find higher values in event than in non-event years. For example, in the 5-year event window, the average government share of GDP is 18.6% in event years and 15.8% in non-event years, the median difference being significant with a p-value of 0.047. This evidence suggests that our results are not driven by general market reforms. 44 According to Megginson and Netter (1997) public share offerings "have accounted for the vast majority of the assets and employees moved from the state to the private sector through privatization".
Case Studies
Australia
Australia's predominantly pre-funded pension system is characterized by moderate demographic challenges and a large stock of pension assets. Pension funding in Australia seriously picked up in 1992 when a mandatory Defined Contribution scheme with high contribution levels (9% of employees' salary) was introduced covering more than 90% of the working population. Prior to that, pre-funded schemes were largely optional and with the public tax-funded pension being considered insufficient, need for reform was imminent. The pensioners in Australia often receive a lump sum at retirement which can lead to retirement income significantly below expectations in a situation of depressed stock markets and high stock allocation in the portfolio (as the case in Anglo-Saxon countries). 45 In its first year of existence the fund already accumulated assets worth 4.9% of GDP ($44bn in 2007) from budget surpluses and privatization proceeds, of which only 16.4% was invested abroad. It is supposed to reach its asset target of AUD148bn in 2020. 46 The equity allocation in 1992 was 32% and has increased to 58% in 2007. The superannuation funds are said to own around a third of the Australian stock market today.
Germany
The world's first pension system was introduced in Germany in 1889 as a fully pre-funded system which supported the initial development of capital markets in Germany. In fact, before
World War I Germany's stock market was more developed than the US stock market (44% of GDP versus 39% of GDP, Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . Nevertheless Germany gradually adopted a public PAYG system with only voluntary private pensions when it redesigned its pension system in 1957 after World War II. 47 While the general economy in Germany recovered quickly from the devastation left by World War II and the public pension system could thus develop to become one of the most generous in the world (Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003) , and while GDP per capita has come close to the level of the US by now, capital market development has lagged that of the Anglo-Saxon world (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) until today, despite significantly higher trade openness of 76% in Germany and 27% in the US. In 2007, the US stock market capitalization was 144% of GDP and corporate bond market capitalization 125% of GDP (pension fund assets 74% of GDP) and the corresponding ratios for Germany were 57% for stock market capitalization and 35% for corporate bond market capitalization (pension fund assets 4% of GDP). The decision to adopt supplementary and voluntary private pension schemes with tax privileges ("Riester-Rente"), which was made in 2001, happened on the back of population ageing and pressure on the sustainability of the generous PAYG system and is expected to lead to significant inflows into capital markets.
The case of Germany illustrates that capital market development is influenced by the pension system and that the pension system decision in turn is influenced by external factors but not so much by existing capital market development.
Poland
Agreeing upon a multi-pillar pension system, Poland has implemented three pension funding Fund to support its first, public pillar. 48 In the second and third pillar the accumulated pension assets measure already 12.2% of GDP in 2007, which is yet little compared with traditionally pre-funded pension systems though. Stock market development has been dramatic with the 47 Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) would argue that a public unfunded system was preferred because of the experience with hyperinflation in the 1920ies, the economic crisis of the early 1930ies, and World War II, which wiped out the middle class in Germany. 48 With $1.2bn under management in 2007 (0.3% of GDP) the fund is yet one of the smallest of its kind.
ratio rising from 14.9% of GDP in 1999 to 42.6% in 2007. 49 It is noteworthy that 34.8% of Poland's pension fund assets are invested in stocks (40% is the legal limit for the mandatory personal schemes), of which in turn 98.2% is invested domestically (the legal minimum limit of 95% for all pension fund assets is one of the tightest restrictions of all countries), which underlines the influence of the pension system for Poland's capital markets.
Poland's case is representative for emerging markets with nascent capital markets and quite radical pension funding reforms where capital markets and pension systems are mutually very dependent. Poland's average pension fund is larger than $2.5bn, the largest average figure in the world. In the accumulation phase capital markets and corporates very much benefit from the continuous supply of domestic capital. Pensioners on the other hand are facing low gross public replacement ratios (27.1% in Poland) and are therefore in need of additional private retirement income and dependent on solid development of domestic capital markets. While domestic businesses thus benefit, the downside for pensioners is, that the non-existing international diversification and the permanent need to invest domestically render the system prone to bubbles and potentially reduce capital market efficiency as well as the risk-return relation, since the market share held by a few pension funds steadily increases over time.
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that the choice of a pension system is an important determinant for the development of capital markets across countries. We employ a unique list of 87 pension funding reforms in 57 countries between 1976 and 2007 to evaluate the reforms' impact on capital markets. We find that pension funding reforms in the form of additional prefunded pension system components or in the form of a fundamental switch from a PAYG-to a pre-funded pension system contribute to larger capital markets, mainly through an increase in primary market issuance activity. This effect cannot be explained by a simultaneous political move to more market-oriented reforms in these countries in general. In emerging markets the effects can be observed on both stock and corporate bond markets. In OECD countries the pension funding effects mainly occur on corporate bond markets. Finally, this paper provides evidence from a capital market perspective for the discussion on the sustainability of pension systems and the healthiness of public budgets and in particular the question whether parameterized solutions to the pension problems are preferable over solutions that involve switching to a more pre-funded system. The results suggest that pension funding reforms can substantially support economies and in particular emerging markets in their process from a bank-centred economy to a market-oriented economy. In turn, as shown by prior research, larger capital markets have positive implications for economic growth.
However, pension funding can also pose challenges, especially for emerging countries, because of the difficult implementation process, portfolio concentration in domestic government securities and a few corporate issuers, reduced free floats, and asset price bubbles. The trade-off between these advantages and drawbacks and in particular the direct contribution of pension funding to more sustainable retirement systems constitute interesting fields for future research. The event list generated for this paper will be useful in this context.
Figure 1 PAYG-financed versus Pre-funded Pension Systems
On the x-axis we report total private pension assets (in the second and third pillar of the pension system) as a percentage of GDP in 2007 for all 30 OECD member countries and on the y-axis we report the gross public replacement rate from the public pension system (first pillar) calculated as the average worker's public pension benefits as percentage of final salaries before retirement in 2007 (data from the OECD). The graph shows that countries can be classified into two groups based on where the majority of retirement income in their pension system comes from, either the mostly unfunded public first pillar or the generally pre-funded second and third pillar. Table 1  Event Countries and Event Years   This table shows those 57 countries from our sample of 72 countries, which have added pre-funded pension components to their pension system between 1976 and 2007 and the corresponding years in which the component was introduced. Sweden introduced a pre-funded component in both the public and the private pillar in 2000 and is therefore counted twice. The information on these 87 pension reforms stems mainly from OECD sources. The OECD Pension Markets in Focus Newsletters as well as the two publications Reforming Public Pensions and OECD Private Pensions Outlook provided the information for the majority of events. Additional information was taken from publications by Allianz Global Investors' economic and pension research team. For those countries where there were no events being mentioned in these sources, we solicited additional sources such as publications by the national pension regulators or relevant ministries as well as scientific papers and country publications by international institutions such as the World Bank. Table 2 Summary Statistics Stock market capitalization / GDP data for the panel is taken from Beck et al. (2000) and ranges from 1976 to 2007. Corporate bond market capitalization / GDP data for the panel is also from Beck et al. (2000) Table 6 The Impact of New Pre-Funded Pension System Components on the Stock MarketDistinguishing Between Equity Issuance and Net Other Effects for Non-OECD Countries
This table shows the results of a GLS panel regression, which has been weighted due to between-group (-country) heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable in Columns (i), (iii), and (v) is the part of the relative growth rate of the ratio of stock market capitalization / GDP, which is due to equity issuance activity. Equity issuance data is taken from Beck et al. (2000) and from the World Federation of Stock Exchanges and ranges from 1980 to 2007. The dependent variable in Columns (ii), (iv), and (vi) is the remaining part of the total relative growth rate of the ratio of stock market capitalization / GDP, which is due to price effects and other non-equity-issuance-related volume effects such as delistings. The level of economic development is measured by the logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP dollars and is taken from Angus Maddison's website at the University of Groningen for the years 1980 to 2006 and manually extended by us to 2007. The event dummy variable is set to equal one in the year where a country introduces a new pre-funded pension system component and in a number of following years (3-, 5-or 10-year event window). All regressions include year and country dummy variables. Newey-West standard errors which are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust are in parentheses. (*) indicates significance at the 10%-level, (**) at the 5%-level, (***) at the 1%-level. Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 . The rule of law indicator is an index taken from La Porta et al. (1997) . Accounting quality, creditor rights, and shareholder rights are all indices taken from La Porta et al. (1998) . All regressions include a constant, whose coefficient is not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) indicates significance at the 10%-level, (**) at the 5%-level, (***) at the 1%-level. 
